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ABSTRACT. This paper develops a theory of the allocation of authority between two par-
ties that produce impure public goods. We show that the optimal allocation depends on
technological factors, the parties’ valuations of the goods produced, and the degree of im-
purity of these goods. When the degree of impurity is large, control rights should be given
to the main investor, irrespective of preference considerations. There are some situations
in which this allocation is optimal even if the degree of impurity is very low as long as one
party’s investment is more important than the other party’s. If the parties’ investments are
of similar importance and the degree of impurity is large, shared authority is optimal with
a greater share going to the low-valuation party. If the importance of the parties’ invest-
ments is similar but the degree of impurity is neither large nor small, the low-valuation
party should receive sole authority. We apply our results to a number of situations, includ-
ing schools and child custody.
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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. Background. Since Simon’s (1951) contribution, authority — that is, the legitimate
power to direct the action of others (Weber, 1968) — has become a central concept in many
economic formulations of the theory of the firm. As pointed out by Grossman and Hart
(1986) and Hart and Moore (1990) (henceforth, GHM), authority can be conferred by the
ownership of an asset, which gives the owner the right to make decisions over the use
of this asset. Using this notion to analyze the allocation of authority within and between
firms involved in the production of pure private goods in an environment where contracts
are incomplete, GHM show that the main investor should have full control of the asset.
Although much progress has been accomplished in the case of pure private goods,1
relatively little has been done to understand the division of responsibilities between the
state and the private sector for the provision of public goods. A notable exception is the
study by Besley and Ghatak (2001) (henceforth, BG). They apply the GHM notion of in-
complete contracting to examine the allocation of authority in public-private partnerships
producing pure public goods, whose benefits are nonrival and nonexcludable. Contrary
to GHM, BG prove that sole authority should be given to the party that values the bene-
fits generated by the goods relatively more irrespective of the relative importance of the
investments.2
In this paper, we too use this notion of authority when contracts are incomplete to
study the allocation of control rights between parties which produce goods that are nei-
ther purely private nor purely public.3 This is important for at least three reasons. First,
many public goods — such as highways, airports, courts, and possibly national defense
and police services — are subject to congestion. These goods therefore are rival, but
nonexcludable to varying degrees (Barro and Sala-I-Martin, 1992). Other public goods
— such as schools, universities, television, waterways, parks, zoos, museums, and trans-
portation facilities — are excludable, in the sense that they are public goods for which
exclusion by means of price or constraints is costless (Brito and Oakland, 1980; Fang and
Norman, 2006). Consumers have access to such goods if they are willing to pay a fee or a
license for the services that such goods provide. Otherwise, access can only be achieved
if the restrictions imposed (sometimes accidentally) by individual agents and institutions
are removed. Second, the considerable expansion of public-private partnerships in many
countries in the last twenty years (BG; World Bank, 2002) has produced a variety of impure
1See for example Hart (1995), Aghion and Tirole (1997), and Aghion et al. (2004).
2Different departures from the GHM’s result have been presented in other models with private goods (e.g.,
De Meza and Lockwood, 1998; Rajan and Zingales, 1998).
3Our model deals with decision-making rights over a large set of decisions. Only a subset of such decisions
will concern asset usage, and, as implied by the GHM-based literature, asset ownership is one of the mech-
anisms that grant control rights over asset use. Most of the other relevant decision-making rights, which
do not have to rely on asset utilization, may be committed to either through the project’s governance struc-
ture or contractually (Aghion and Tirole, 1997; Hart and Holmstro¨m, 2002; Bester, 2005). In what follows,
therefore, we employ the terms authority, control rights, and decision-making rights interchangeably.
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public goods (see also the discussion in the next subsection).4 Our analysis therefore is
important for its implications for policy. Third, by considering impure public goods, our
model allows us to assess the robustness of the GHM’s and BG’s results when there are
perturbations away from the pure private and pure public world respectively.
Not only do GHM and BG focus on the two extreme cases of goods (pure private and
pure public), but they also restrict attention to two polar cases of authority allocation,
those in which one or the other party is allocated full control rights. Clearly, this con-
trasts with what we observe within firms (as confirmed, for example, by the analysis of
Aghion and Tirole (1997) and Aghion et al. (2004)). It is also not consistent with most of
the authority arrangements that have emerged between governments and private firms
engaged in the provision of impure public goods around the world (see the discussion
in Section 6), where authority is often shared. Our analysis shows that there are circum-
stances in which the two sole authority allocations are dominated by a shared authority
allocation in which each party has some authority.
1.2. Examples. We provide some examples of impure public goods, and draw attention
to issues related to their provision and authority allocation. We emphasize where the
sources of “impurity” may come from and how authority interacts with investments.
1.2.1. Public-Private Projects. The provision of public goods and services through public-
private partnerships has increasingly become more common in many industrialized and
developing countries.5 Such partnerships comprise a wide range of collaborations be-
tween public and private sector partners, with the involvement of the private sector vary-
ing considerably: from designing schools, hospitals, roads, waterways and sanitation ser-
vices, to undertaking their financing, construction, operation, maintenance, management
and, crucially, ownership. BG illustrate their model by considering the case in which
a government and a nongovernmental organization (NGO) can invest in improving the
quality of a school. It is crucial that the investment levels of the two parties are non-
contractible, and that the value created by the investments is a pure public good (i.e.,
nonrival and nonexcludable). When this is the case, BG show that the party with the
highest valuation on the benefits generated by the investment in the school should be the
sole owner.
4This expansion has been recently accompanied by a growing economic literature on the properties of dif-
ferent forms of public procurement, including public-private partnerships. Most of these studies, however,
are generally cast in a more complete contracting environment than in the GHM-based world used in our
paper. See, among others, Martimont and Pouyet (2006).
5The United Kingdom, Australia, Canada and the United States stand out as world leaders in the number
and scale of such projects. For example, in the UK between 1992 and 2003, over 570 public-private projects
have been funded for a combined capital value of about £36 billion. Current projects have committed the
UK government to a stream of revenue payments to private sector contractors between 2004 and 2029 of
about £110 billion (Allen, 2003). In developing countries, 20 percent of infrastructure investments (or about
$580 billion) were funded by the private sector over the 1990s (World Development Report, 2002, chapter
8).
4 MARCO FRANCESCONI AND ABHINAY MUTHOO
Improving the quality of a school or building and operating a new school are valuable
public investments, regardless of whether the school is owned by the state or by a private
organization. But issues of excludability arise if children of specific groups are excluded
from accessing the school, perhaps unintentionally and even if fees are not charged. This
may happen for instance when children come from families that are too poor and live too
far away from the school, or when they come from religious or ethnic minorities which are
unwelcome in the school environment (World Development Report, 2004). Even when, in
line with BG, the school is not owned by the state because the NGO cares more about it,
the government may impose regulations (e.g., academic curricula and admission rules)
which could effectively dilute the value of the project to the NGO. In all these circum-
stances, as excludability increases, the school services lose part of their public nature, and
investment and technology considerations are expected to become more relevant, as in
GHM.
1.2.2. State Funding of Basic Research. Basic scientific research is typically considered a
public good. This is perhaps the reason why most governments around the world provide
for its funding. In the United States, since the passage of the 1980 Patent and Trademark
Amendments, universities have the right to retain the exclusive property rights associated
with inventions deriving from federally funded research. Before 1980, instead, it was the
government to have the right to claim all royalties and other income from patents result-
ing from federally funded research (Henderson et al., 1998). This shift in ownership of
patents and intellectual property rights is in line with BG’s arguments, as long as univer-
sities value the benefits generated by their inventions more than the main investor (the
government).
Elements of excludability however arise when inventors (either universities or individ-
ual scientists) obtain license agreements with private sector firms (Jensen and Thursby,
2001), or patent through external channels (e.g., setting up new independent firms), or
manage to extract large shares of royalties (Lach and Schankerman, 2004). In these cir-
cumstances, the government may have little incentive to invest unless it receives (some)
ownership of the inventions it funded. In fact, as in the GHM’s framework, when ex-
clusion is complete, we may expect the government — as the sole investor — to retain
exclusive control rights irrespective of the relative valuations about the benefits of re-
search.6
1.2.3. Child Custody After Divorce. Children are generally viewed as household pure pub-
lic goods when parents are married (Becker, 1991). If they retain their (local) pure public
nature even after their parents divorce, and if the mother has the highest valuation, then
— in line with BG’s model — she should receive custody regardless of whether or not she
6Similar considerations apply in the case of other publicly funded activities, such as fine arts and classical
music. Here excludability arise when a piece of art can only be displayed in museums or performed in
opera houses at prices that could disproportionately exclude certain groups of citizens, e.g., poor or less
educated people (Fenn et al., 2004).
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is the key investor.7 Custody will go to the father instead, if he values the benefits gener-
ated by the child relatively more. However, when parents are divorced, children can be
seen as impure public goods to the extent that the non-custodial parent is excluded (or
limited) to access them by the custodial parent (Weiss and Willis, 1985). An important im-
plication of this exclusion is the very low compliance with court orders on child support
payments (Del Boca and Flinn, 1995). In the extreme case of full excludability, whereby
the non-custodial parent cannot enjoy the value of the investments in the child and the
child is a private good to the custodial parent, custody should be allocated solely on the
basis of investment considerations, as in GHM.
1.3. Our Contribution. This paper develops a theory of authority allocation between
parties that produce impure public goods. In a world with contractual incompleteness,
the ex-post allocation of control rights matters, as it does in the standard GHM-based
literature. We contribute to this literature in two fundamental ways. First, we focus on
impure public goods, that is, public goods that, to differing degrees, can be rival or exclud-
able. This adds to the scant knowledge on the pure public goods ownership allocation,
for which BG provide the only thorough analysis available to date.8 Second, we allow
parties to share authority, that is, each party has control rights over a subset of decisions.9
As the previous subsection has illustrated, impure public goods often embed complex
bundles of goods and services, the provision of which may require parties to exercise
rights over, or have differential access to, different critical resources (Rajan and Zingales,
1998). Therefore, the notion of shared authority seems to fit many situations with impure
public goods quite naturally. A primary example of this is given by shared child custody
after divorce.
Our baseline model involves two parties, such as a government and an NGO (or a gov-
ernment and a university, or two parents), investing in a common project. The investment
will increase the value of the project’s service and this is an impure public good to the two
parties.10 Because contracts are incomplete and thus investments are subject to holdup,
we have a theory of authority allocation that tells us how control rights over the project’s
service should be distributed between the two parties to maximize the net surplus gener-
ated by their investments. We show that, in a broad range of cases, the optimal allocation
of authority depends on the technology structure (as in GHM), the parties’ relative val-
uations of the goods produced (as in BG), and the degree of impurity. When the degree
7BG reach this conclusion provided that parents’ investments are complements (p. 1366).
8Hart et al. (1997) also consider ownership allocations of pure public goods between the state and a private
firm. In their framework, however, ownership is solely driven by technological factors. This is because the
private firm does not directly care about the project, unlike in BG and our models.
9The notion of shared authority is distinct from that of joint authority, according to which each party has
veto rights over all decisions (as in BG and Halonen, 2002). We shall return to the possibility of joint
authority in Section 5.2.
10Our analysis also holds for any type of organizations (i.e., for-profit firms too) as long as they care about
the project (Glaeser and Shleifer, 2001).
6 MARCO FRANCESCONI AND ABHINAY MUTHOO
of impurity is very small (and, therefore, we are in a world a´ la BG), authority should
be given to the high-valuation party, irrespective of investment considerations. This is
consistent with BG. When the degree of impurity instead is large, control rights should
be entirely given to the main investor, irrespective of preference considerations. This is
consistent with GHM. In fact, there is a wide range of situations in which this allocation
is optimal even if the degree of impurity is low provided that one party’s investment is
more important than the other party’s. On the other hand, if the parties’ investments are
of similar importance and the degree of impurity is large, shared authority is optimal, and
a relatively greater share should go to the low-valuation party. The low-valuation party
will get sole authority if both parties investments are of similar importance and the degree
of impurity is neither large nor small. The last two allocations emerge because the party
with the highest valuation would invest anyway, while the low-valuation party would
be endowed with greater bargaining power. This specific “balancing out” of bargaining
chips is a distinctive feature of a world with impure public goods.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out our basic model,
presents some preliminary results, and discusses our main assumptions. Sections 3 and
4 consider the optimal allocations of authority when only one party invests and when
both parties invest, respectively. Section 5 develops a number of extensions (e.g., the
case in which there are more than two parties, the presence of ex-post uncertainty, and
the possibility of joint authority). Section 6 reviews some applications, especially to the
provision of schools services by public-private partnerships, and to child custody. Section
7 concludes.
2. THE MODEL
Consider a situation in which a government and an NGO discuss whether or not and
how to collaborate in the management and running of a project (e.g., a local primary
school). The first main issue is to allocate decision-making rights between the two parties.
After this is done, the parties undertake project-specific investments. These investments
are too costly to be verified by “third” parties (such as the courts), and hence they cannot
be contracted upon. Each party will undertake whatever level of investment it wishes to,
and, once undertaken, investments are observable by both parties.
Given an allocation of authority and a pair of investment levels, the project’s benefits
are higher if the parties make decisions cooperatively rather than via the allocated control
rights. This means that there exists a surplus, and the parties will negotiate over its par-
tition. Each party’s marginal returns to investment are influenced by the outcome of this
ex-post bargaining, in which the ex-ante allocated control rights determine the parties’
default payoffs from not reaching agreement. Hence, each party’s investment incentives
indirectly depend on the allocated control rights. A central objective of our analysis is to
characterize the optimal allocation of authority, one that maximizes the parties’ ex-ante
joint payoffs from partnership.
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2.1. Formal Structure. Two players, government g and NGO n, are to be involved in a
joint project. There are three critical dates at which they will interact.
Date 0: Authority — The players jointly select an allocation of authority (control rights)
between them. We formalize this choice in a reduced-form manner: a share π (where
π ∈ [0, 1]) of such authority is allocated to g, and the remaining share 1− π is allocated
to n. If π = 1 (π = 0), then the government (NGO) is allocated control rights over all
matters on which decisions need to be taken. This can be interpreted as the government
(NGO) having sole authority. But if π ∈ (0, 1), and thus each player has some power,
authority is shared.
Date 1: Investments — At least one of the players has an opportunity to undertake an
investment that increases the benefits generated by the project. Let yi denote the invest-
ment level of i (i = g, n). The cost of investing yi, incurred by i at this date, is Ci(yi). This
function satisfies
Assumption 1. Ci is strictly increasing, convex and twice continuously differentiable, with
Ci(0) = 0.
After the investments are sunk, the two parties face the following bargaining situation.
If decisions are taken via the allocated control rights, π , the project’s benefits are given by
B(y, π), where y ≡ (yg, yn). But if decisions are taken cooperatively, the project’s benefits
are b(y), where b(y) > B(y, π). Both players then can mutually benefit from making
decisions cooperatively. We assume that B is linear in π , so that:
B(y, π) = πBg(y) + (1− π)Bn(y),
where Bi(y) denotes the project’s benefits when i has sole authority.
Date 2: Bargaining — The players negotiate over whether or not to cooperate in decision-
making and over the level of a monetary transfer from n to g or from g to n. If agreement
is reached, the payoffs to g and n are respectively
ug(y) = θgb(y) + t and(1)
un(y) = θnb(y)− t,(2)
where θi > 0 is i’s valuation parameter of the project’s benefits, and t is a monetary
payment from n to g which can be positive or negative. But if they fail to reach agreement,
the project operates via the allocated control rights and the default payoffs are
ug(y, π) = θg
[
πBg(y) + (1−α)(1− π)Bn(y)
]
and(3)
un(y, π) = θn
[
(1−α)πBg(y) + (1− π)Bn(y)
]
,(4)
where α ∈ [0, 1] is a parameter that captures the degree of impurity of the goods gen-
erated by the project. BG analyze this framework but with the implicit assumption that
α = 0 (and π ∈ {0, 1}); they are concerned with pure public goods and do not consider
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shared authority allocations. Our more general setup allows us to study the full spectrum
of goods, from the extreme case of pure private goods (α = 1), which is the focus of GHM,
to the other extreme case of pure public goods (α = 0).
Since b(y) > B(y, π), it follows that ug(y) + un(y) > ug(y, π) + un(y, π). Hence, it
is mutually beneficial (efficient) for the players to negotiate an agreement and make de-
cisions cooperatively at date 2. To describe the outcome of such negotiations we adopt
the Nash bargaining solution, in which the threat (or disagreement) point is defined by
the players’ default payoffs (3) and (4). We place the following restrictions on the benefit
functions:
Assumption 2.
(i) b is a strictly increasing, strictly concave and twice continuously differentiable function satis-
fying the Inada endpoint conditions, with b(0, 0) > 0.
(ii) For each i = g, n, Bi is a non-decreasing, concave and twice continuously differentiable func-
tion, with Bi(0, 0) ≥ 0.
(iii) For any y, b1(y) ≥ Bg1(y) > Bn1 (y) and b2(y) ≥ Bn2 (y) > Bg2(y).
(iv) For any y, b12(y) ≥ Bg12(y), Bn12(y) ≥ 0.
Assumption 2(iii) implies that the marginal return to each player’s investment is high-
est when decisions are made cooperatively, second highest when that player has sole
authority, and lowest when the other player has sole authority. Assumption 2(iv) says
that investments are weak complements.
2.2. Preliminary Results. For any π and y, the Nash-bargained payoff to i gross of the
investment cost incurred at date 1 (i = g, n) is
Vi(y, π) =
1
2
(θg +θn)b(y) +
1
2
[
ui(y, π)− uj(y, π)
]
( j = i).
That is, Vi equals one-half of the gross surplus plus a factor (the second term) that cap-
tures the difference in the players’ default payoffs. After substituting for the default pay-
offs, using (3) and (4), re-arranging terms and simplifying, we obtain
Vg(y, π) =
1
2
(θg +θn)b(y) +
1
2
(θg −θn)B(y, π) + α2
[
θnπBg(y)−θg(1− π)Bn(y)
]
,(5)
Vn(y, π) =
1
2
(θg +θn)b(y)− 12 (θg −θn)B(y, π)−
α
2
[
θnπBg(y)−θg(1− π)Bn(y)
]
.(6)
The first-best investment levels maximize the difference between the gross surplus, (θg +
θn)b(y), and the total cost of investments, Cg(yg) + Cn(yn). In contrast, the investment
levels that are actually chosen are a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of the date 1 simultaneous-
move game in which each player maximizes the difference between its Nash-bargained
payoff and its cost of investment.
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Lemma A.1 establishes that this investment game has a unique Nash equilibrium,
ye(π) ≡ (yeg(π), yen(π)), and that it possesses some important properties. (For ease of
exposition, the lemma and its proof are detailed in the appendix.) We use the results of
this lemma to characterize the optimal value of π . This maximizes the players’ date 0
equilibrium net surplus:11
(7) max
0≤π≤1
S(π) ≡ Vg(ye(π), π) +Vn(ye(π), π)− Cg(yeg(π))− Cn(yen(π)).
After making use of the first-order conditions which deliver the Nash equilibrium ye(π)
(see the appendix) and noting that Vg3 +V
n
3 = 0, the derivative of S with respect to π is
(8) S′(π) = Vg2 (y
e(π), π)
[
∂yen
∂π
]
+Vn1 (y
e(π), π)
[∂yeg
∂π
]
.
Lemma A.1 shows that the effect of a marginal change in π on the players’ respective
equilibrium investment levels depends on the signs of Vg13 and V
n
23. These two cross-
partial derivatives capture the effects of a marginal change in π on the players’ respective
marginal returns on investments. For any π and y,
Vg13 ≡
∂
∂π
[∂Vg
∂yg
]
=
1
2
[
(θg −θn)[Bg1 − Bn1 ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
BG effect
+α[θgBn1 +θnB
g
1 ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
GHM effect
]
,(9)
Vn23 ≡
∂
∂π
[
∂Vn
∂yn
]
=
1
2
[
(θg −θn)[Bn2 − Bg2 ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
BG effect
−α[θgBn2 +θnBg2 ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
GHM effect
]
.(10)
The right-hand sides of each of these two expressions depend on y, but not on π . Given
Claim A.1(i) and (iii) stated in the appendix and Assumption 1, it follows that if, for
all y, both Vg13 and V
n
23 are non-negative (non-positive) with at least one of them being
strictly positive (strictly negative), then both players’ equilibrium investments are strictly
increasing (strictly decreasing) in π over its domain. Since Vg2 > 0 and V
n
1 > 0, from (8)
we have:
Claim 1. If, for all y, expressions (9) and (10) are non-negative (non-positive) with at least one
of them being strictly positive (strictly negative), then it is optimal to set π = 1 (π = 0).
The right-hand side of (9) decomposes the effect of a marginal change in π on g’s invest-
ment incentives into two terms. The first term, which we call BG effect, can be positive
or negative depending on whether g values the project’s benefits more or less than n.
The second term, which we label GHM effect, is strictly positive when there exists some
degree of impurity (α > 0), and zero in the degenerate case of no impurity (α = 0).
11Player i’s Nash bargained-payoff Vi depends on y ≡ (yg, yn) and π , and hence we write it as Vi(y, π). For
each i = g, n, we denote by Vik(y, π) (or simply V
i
k) the first-order partial derivative of V
i with respect to its
k-th argument (k = 1, 2, 3), where the first argument is yg, the second yn and the third π . The second-order
partial derivatives are denoted by Vikl(y, π) (or simply V
i
kl), where k, l = 1, 2, 3.
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This decomposition shows that g’s investment incentives are driven by two potentially
opposing forces: preferences and technology.
To gain some intuition, consider the case in which n places a relatively higher value on
the project. Then, in the expression for Vg13, the BG effect is negative while the GHM effect
is positive. With θn > θg and B
g
1 > B
n
1 , the BG effect arises because n’s default payoff is
higher when g has sole authority than when n has sole authority. This is the key reason
why g’s relative bargaining power is higher when n has sole authority than when g has
sole authority. In contrast, the GHM effect comes about from the intuition that allocating
more authority to an investor increases its relative bargaining power. Consequently, with
impure public goods (0 < α < 1), g’s aggregate relative bargaining power is the sum of
these two opposing effects.12 The trade-off between these two effects will play a central
role in the analysis of Sections 3 and 4.
The BG effect entails allocating all of the control rights (sole authority) to the player
who values the project’s benefits the most. This effect works in the same direction for
both parties, in the sense that there is no conflict between g and n. This is not true for the
GHM effect, which entails that an investor should be allocated sole authority. As can be
seen from (9) (alternatively (10)), the GHM effect is positive (negative), and hence g’s (n’s)
marginal returns are increasing (decreasing) in π . Moreover, when both parties invest, the
optimal allocation may require a compromise in the provision of investment incentives
to the two players. In some of such cases shared authority will arise at the optimum (see
Section 4).
2.3. Discussion of the Basic Ingredients of the Model. We underline six features of our
model. First, authority is conceptualized in a reduced form fashion. One may think of this
formulation along the following line of argument. There are many (formally a continuum
of) issues on which decisions have to be taken, all of which are equally important to
the project’s benefits. An allocation of the large number of control rights is then payoff-
equivalent to an allocation of shares.13 The development of a micro-founded formulation
of authority is an important extension which, however, goes beyond the scope of the
paper.
Second, as in the GHM-related literature, our model is based on the presumption that
if it is optimal for the two players to collaborate and agree to some authority allocation,
then they will do so. The focus here is on the analysis of the optimal authority allocation.
A sufficient condition for this presumption to hold is that Coase theorem applies: at date
12An analogous interpretation applies to (10) in relation to the effect of a marginal change in π on n’s
investment incentives.
13The fact that there are many decisions to be taken in the context of non-trivial organizations is perhaps
unarguable. But there is some loss of generality, of course, in the presumption that these decisions are
all equally important. Decisions on some matters (e.g., whether English or Hindi is the main language of
instruction in Indian schools) are far more consequential than decisions on other matters (e.g., whether the
morning school break is to be at one time or another).
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0, the parties bargain in the absence of any frictions and, if necessary, can make lump-
sum transfers (the extent of which depends on the parties’ date 0 outside options and the
nature of the optimal authority allocation).
Third, in relation to the non-verifiable investment decisions, two features merit atten-
tion. Firstly, investments are undertaken just once and, secondly, they are perfectly ob-
servable to the two parties after they are undertaken. While these two assumptions are
standard in the literature, they might be unrealistic. Relaxing the perfect observability
assumption means that bargaining over the date 2 surplus takes place under conditions
of asymmetric information, and this may imply that with positive probability the players
fail to strike an agreement to make decisions cooperatively. This, in turn, may alter some
of the main insights on the ex-ante optimal authority allocation.
Fourth, there exists an ex-post surplus. Section 5.3 relaxes this assumption by consid-
ering the case in which with a small but positive probability, the surplus does not exist.
In this case, with a small probability it is ex-post efficient for the players not to reach an
agreement, but to operate under the allocated control rights.
Fifth, the way in which we apply the Nash bargaining solution can be justified by as-
suming that the players bargain strategically, with the default payoffs being identified as
the players’ inside option payoffs (Muthoo, 1999). This means that during any significant
delay in reaching agreement, the players would operate the project under the default allo-
cated control rights (which is consistent with many real-life public-private partnerships).
Of course, in equilibrium, no delay occurs, but these out-of-equilibrium payoffs shape the
nature of the equilibrium division of the surplus.14
Sixth, the structure of the model is common knowledge. In many circumstances, how-
ever, this may not be the case because, for example, a party’s valuation would be its
private information. This extension is left for future research.
3. OPTIMAL AUTHORITY WITH SOLE INVESTOR
The case of a sole investor may be interpreted as a limiting case in which the other
player’s investment has a negligible impact on the project’s benefits. This will provide an
explicit understanding of some of the forces at work. It may also be of general interest
because in some situations only one party invests. We consider the case in which the sole
investor is the government. The analysis therefore is restricted to equation (9), as the issue
of the investment incentives for n (and thus (10)) is no longer relevant.
We begin by examining the two extreme cases already studied in the literature (pure
public goods and pure private goods), and by considering the optimal allocation when
the parties have identical valuations.
14An alternative way is to treat the default payoffs as the players’ outside option payoffs (Muthoo, 1999).
This means that during any significant delay in reaching agreement, the project comes to a halt: each player
has the option to stop the negotiations unilaterally and get the project going under the allocated control
rights, without any further negotiation to reach agreement. The outside-option bargaining approach would
alter some, but not all, of the results obtained under the inside-option bargaining approach.
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Lemma 1 (Benchmark Cases). Assume that g is the sole investor.
(a) (Pure Public Good) If α = 0, then it is optimal to allocate sole authority to the player who has
the relatively higher valuation.
(b) (Pure Private Good) If α = 1, then it is optimal to allocate sole authority to the sole investor,
g.
(c) (Identical Valuations) In the degenerate case when the parties have the same valuation, any
authority allocation is optimal if α = 0; but if α > 0, then it is optimal to allocate sole authority
to the sole investor, g.
Proof. The results of this lemma can be easily derived from Claim 1. Parts (a), (b) and (c)
follow immediately from examining the sign of the right-hand side of (9) after substitut-
ing for α = 0, α = 1 and θg = θn, respectively. 
As in BG, Lemma 1(a) shows that in the case of a pure public good, sole authority
should go to the player who cares most about it, irrespective of the investor and the im-
portance of its investment. Conversely, in the GHM case of a pure private good, Lemma
1(b) shows that control rights should entirely go the sole investor, irrespective of how
important its investment is and whether the non-investor has a higher or a lower valu-
ation. Lemma 1(c) confirms BG’s result that in the case of a pure public good, authority
does not matter when the parties have identical valuations; but for any positive degree of
impurity, authority does matter and should be fully given to the sole investor, regardless
of how important its investment is.
We now move beyond these benchmark cases. Examining the right-hand side of (9), we
see that if g, the sole investor, is the player with the relatively higher valuation, then both
BG and GHM effects are in the same direction, and it is optimal to allocate sole authority
to g. But if n values the project’s benefits more than g does, then the GHM effect is in the
opposite direction of the BG effect. In this case the BG effect is negative while the GHM
effect is strictly positive, provided there is some degree of impurity, otherwise Lemma
1(a) applies. Suppose θg < θn. Equation (9) can be rewritten as
(11) Vg13 ≡
∂
∂π
[∂Vg
∂yg
]
=
1
2
[[
θg − (1−α)θn
]
Bg1 +
[
θn − (1−α)θg
]
Bn1
]
.
While the first term on the right-hand side of (11) (the term involving Bg1) can be positive
or negative, the second term is strictly positive, since θg < θn. The first term is non-
negative if and only if α ≥ (θn −θg)/θn. Hence, under such parametric restrictions the
right-hand side of (11) is strictly positive, and hence g should be optimally allocated sole
authority. We summarize these results in the following:
Proposition 1. If g is the sole investor and α ≥ (θn −θg)/θn, then it is optimal to allocate sole
authority to g.
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This means that if the degree of impurity is sufficiently large, control rights should
be entirely given to the sole investor. The key insight of GHM is thus robust to small
perturbations along the private-public good dimension.
Consider now the remaining set of parameter values for which θg < θn and α < (θn −
θg)/θn. In this case, the right-hand side of (11) may not keep the same sign for any y (since
the first term is negative while the second is positive). Thus, we have to impose some
additional structure on the relationship between the marginal returns when g has sole
authority and when n has sole authority. Our next result is derived under the assumption
that the ratio Bn1 (y)/B
g
1(y) is constant and independent of y. This assumption is borrowed
from BG (p. 1355).
Assume that, for any y, Bn1 (y) = βgB
g
1(y), where βg ∈ (0, 1). Following BG and Hart
et al. (1997), one may interpret 1−βg as the proportion of the returns on g’s investment
that cannot be realized without g’s continued cooperation. After substituting for Bn1 (y) in
(11), simplifying, and rearranging terms, it follows that
Vg13 ≡
∂
∂π
[∂Vg
∂yg
]
=
1
2
[
(1− θ̂)(1−βg)︸ ︷︷ ︸
BG effect
+ α(θ̂ +βg)︸ ︷︷ ︸
GHM effect
]
 0 ⇐⇒ α  α∗g ,(12)
where α∗g = [(θ̂− 1)(1−βg)]/(θ̂ +βg) and θ̂ = θn/θg. We thus obtain:
Proposition 2. Assume that g is the sole investor and that Bn1 (y) = βgB
g
1(y) (for any y, with
βg ∈ (0, 1)). If α > α∗g (α < α∗g), then it is optimal to allocate sole authority to g (n).
Figure 1 illustrates Proposition 2 in the (θ̂,α) space. In the non-shaded area, it is optimal
to allocate sole authority to the investor, g, while in the shaded area control rights should
be entirely given to the non-investor, n. The optimal allocation does not depend on the
importance of the investment (i.e., on the investment’s marginal benefits), but depends
on the other three key parameters: α (the degree of impurity), θ̂ (the parties’ relative
valuation), and βg (the degree to which the sole investor is dispensable).
For all the (θ̂,α) combinations such that θ̂ < 1, allocating sole authority to g regardless
of the degree of impurity of the public good is consistent with both BG and GHM. In that
region, in fact, the sole investor happens to have also a higher valuation for the project.
But if the non-investor has a relatively higher value, θ̂ > 1, the BG and GHM effects go
in opposite directions. On one hand, the GHM result (sole authority to the sole investor)
arises whenever there is a sufficiently high degree of impurity, α > 1 − βg, which is
independent of the parties’ relative valuation. On the other hand, the BG result (sole
authority to the non-investor) emerges whenever the degree of impurity is sufficiently
low, α < α∗g , which does depend on θ̂. Thus, both effects are robust to perturbations
along the private-public good dimension.
Notice, however, that there is a non-negligible region in Figure 1 in which sole authority
is given to the investor even if the non-investor cares more about the project and the
degree of impurity is relatively small. This allocation is clearly inconsistent with BG’s
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α

θ̂
1
1−βg
0
0 1


α = α∗g
n-sole authority
g-sole authority
g-sole authority
FIGURE 1. An illustration of Proposition 2, where θ̂ ≡ θn/θg.
general insight. It arises because when θ̂(> 1) decreases, the size of the BG effect declines
at a faster rate than the size of the GHM effect (see the two terms in brackets in (12))
as long as there is a positive (albeit small) degree of impurity, i.e., α < 1 − βg. The
presence of some excludability over the project’s benefit, therefore, makes BG’s results
less compelling.
Now consider the situation in which the sole investor’s dispensability βg increases. In
this case, there is a set of (θ̂,α) combinations for which the equilibrium shifts from sole
n-authority to sole g-authority. The intuition for this result stems from the fact that as
1−βg declines, the BG effect is weakened relative to the GHM effect.15 Hence, g should
receive sole authority precisely because this maintains its investment incentives.
To conclude the analysis of this section, we emphasize three results. First, both BG and
GHM’s insights are generally robust to small perturbations along the private-public good
dimension. Second, there are however situations in which this result does not hold, with
the BG effect being dominated by the GHM effect. This is driven by the fact that we look
at impure public goods. Third, shared authority is never optimal. With only one investor,
sole authority (either to the investor or to the non-investor) always generates a higher
surplus than any form of sharing of that authority.
15In the limit (as βg → 1), the BG effect is eliminated. This observation holds more generally. As the differ-
ence Bg1 − Bn1 decreases the BG effect shrinks, and as this difference goes to zero, the BG effect disappears.
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FIGURE 2. An illustration of Proposition 3, where θ̂ ≡ θn/θg.
4. OPTIMAL AUTHORITY WHEN BOTH INVEST
We now turn to the general case in which both players undertake investments at date 1.
Our first set of results shows the extent to which the results of Proposition 2 apply to this
case. Let α∗n = [(1− θ̂)(1−βn)]/(1 + θ̂βn), where both θ̂ and α∗g are defined just before
Proposition 2.
Proposition 3. Assume that both parties can invest at date 1, Bn1 (y) = βgB
g
1(y) and B
g
2(y) =
βnBn2 (y) (for any y, with βg,βn ∈ (0, 1)).
(a) If θ̂ > 1 and α ≤ α∗g, then it is optimal to allocate sole authority to n (i.e., π∗ = 0).
(b) If θ̂ < 1 and α ≤ α∗n, then it is optimal to allocate sole authority to g (i.e., π∗ = 1).
Proof. These results are easily derived from Claim 1. Using the hypotheses of this propo-
sition, it is straightforward to verify that
Vg13  0 ⇐⇒ α  α∗g and Vn23  0 ⇐⇒ α∗n  α.
Note that if θ̂ > 1 then α∗g > 0 > α∗n, and if θ̂ < 1 then α∗n > 0 > α∗g . 
Figure 2 illustrates these results in the (θ̂,α) space. In the two shaded areas the prin-
ciple under which control rights are allocated is consistent with BG’s main insight: sole
authority should be given to the high-valuation party. Clearly, technological conditions
embedded in βg and βn also matter, to the extent that they affect the shape of these two
regions. There are, however, some (θ̂,α) combinations for which this principle cannot
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be applied even for small perturbations from the pure public good case. These combi-
nations lie in the non-shaded area of Figure 2 — i.e., for combinations of (θ̂,α) such that
α > max{α∗g ,α∗n}. In this region the optimal value of π cannot be determined with Claim
1 since Vg13 > 0 and V
n
23 < 0. To derive the optimal authority allocation for parameter val-
ues in this region, we thus impose some more structure on the benefit and cost functions.
Following BG (p. 1355), let b(y) = agμ(yg) + anμ(yn), Bg(y) = agμ(yg) + βnanμ(yn)
and Bn(y) = βgagμ(yg) + anμ(yn), where μ is a strictly increasing, strictly concave, and
twice differentiable function satisfying the Inada endpoint conditions, with μ(0) > 0. The
strictly positive parameters ag and an denote the importance of the investments, and βg
and βn are defined in Proposition 3, with 1− βi capturing the proportion of the returns
on i’s investment that cannot be realized if j has sole authority (i.e., without i’s continued
cooperation), where i, j = g, n and j = i.
Our next result considers the optimal authority allocation for the perfectly symmetric
scenario, in which the parties’ valuations are identical, their investments are of equal
importance, and they are equally dispensable:
Proposition 4. Assume that θg = θn, an = ag, and βg = βn. If α = 0 then any π ∈ [0, 1] is
optimal, but for any α > 0, the optimal authority allocation is π∗ = 1/2 (i.e., equal sharing of
authority).
Proof. In the appendix. 
In this fully symmetric situation, optimality requires allocating an equal amount of
authority across the two parties, as long as there is some positive degree of impurity. But,
perhaps surprisingly, there is discontinuity at α = 0 (the case of a pure public good): in
this case, the allocation of authority does not matter.
Moving away from this perfectly symmetric case, we examine two opposite situations.
The first is one in which one party’s investment is sufficiently more important than the
other party’s investment (i.e., an/ag is either sufficiently large or sufficiently small). In the
second case, we analyze situations in which the importance of both parties’ investments
is relatively similar.
In the first case, sole authority is preferred to shared authority, and it should be al-
located to the party whose investment is relatively more important. This conclusion is
valid irrespective of relative valuations, as long as the (θ̂,α) combinations lie in the non-
shaded region of Figure 2.16 The intuition of this result is simple: when the investment of
one party is more consequential for the success of the project, the GHM effect dominates,
whereby control rights must be given exclusively to that party. Formally:
16It is worthwhile pointing out that, as βg and βn tend to one (i.e., both parties become fully dispensable),
the non-shaded area of Figure 2 covers the entire (θ̂,α) space, with the exclusion of the α = 0 line. Thus,
the relevance of Proposition 5 is general in this extreme case. At the limit, whenα = 0, Proposition 3 shows
that control rights should be entirely given to the party with the higher valuation (as in BG).
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FIGURE 3. An illustration of Proposition 6, where θ̂ ≡ θn/θg.
Proposition 5. Fix any parameter values in the non-shaded region of Figure 2. If one party’s
investment is sufficiently more important than the other party’s investment, then sole authority is
preferred to shared authority, and it should be allocated to the party whose investment is relatively
more important.
Proof. In the appendix. 
For the second class of situations, those in which the importance of the parties’ invest-
ments is relatively similar, our result is given in the following:17
Proposition 6. Assume that the importance of the parties’ investments is similar.
(a) If the degree of impurity is sufficiently small, then sole authority should be allocated to the
high-valuation party.
(b) If the degree of impurity is sufficiently large, then shared authority is the optimal allocation,
with the low-valuation party receiving a relatively larger share.
(c) If the degree of impurity is neither sufficiently small nor sufficiently large, then sole authority
should optimally be allocated to the low-valuation party.
Proof. In the appendix. 
17The appendix contains a more formal characterization of this proposition.
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Figure 3 illustrates this result in the (θ̂,α) space.18 We emphasize three points. First,
there is a wide range of parameter combinations in which the two parties share author-
ity at the optimum. In such situations, n will have a greater share of control rights if g
cares more about the project, and vice versa g will have a greater share if n has a higher
valuation. This result goes against BG’s main intuition. But it reflects the way in which
the GHM effect operates: by providing goods that have some degree of excludability, the
two parties must spread their control rights in order to equalize their ex-post bargaining
powers. This equalization is a covenant whereby the two parties’ investment incentives
are balanced out, given that both investments are relatively important.
Second, as the degree of impurity gets smaller, we move from shared authority to sole
authority. The way in which control rights are allocated echoes the GHM principle just
discussed: sole authority goes to the party who cares relatively less about the project, pre-
cisely because this restores equal bargaining powers between parties whose investments
are similarly relevant. Third, when the extent of excludability is very small, sole authority
is again optimal and, consistent with BG, should be given to the party who cares more for
the project.
We close this section pointing out three general results. First, as in the case with only
one investor, there are circumstances in which both BG and GHM’s insights are robust to
small perturbations along the private-public good dimension. Second, as in the previous
section, there are many situations in which this is not straightforwardly true. In these
situations, the notion of equalizing bargaining powers operates in a way such that control
rights are optimally spread across parties in order to keep their investment incentives
undiminished. Third, in stark contrast with the results of the previous section, there are
cases in which shared authority is the preferred allocation, especially when both parties’
investments are of comparable importance. This can provide an economic foundation to
a number of actual shared authority allocations, such as joint custody of children after
divorce (see Section 6).
5. EXTENSIONS
In this section we discuss the robustness of our main results to some alternative specifi-
cations. First, we consider three or more parties (e.g., a government and multiple NGOs).
Second, we discuss whether there are circumstances under which joint authority would
dominate the optimal shared authority allocation. Third, we introduce ex-post uncer-
tainty which may lead the parties to operate the project at date 2 under the date 0 allocated
control rights.
18In the figure we account for additional formal properties of the optimum stated in the appendix. The
arrows at the top of the figure indicate the direction in which π∗ is strictly increasing (over the region in
which π∗ lies between zero and one): (i) π∗ is strictly increasing in θ̂; and (ii) π∗ is strictly increasing (strictly
decreasing) in α when θ̂ < 1 (> 1).
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5.1. Multiple NGOs. In many public-private projects, the government is involved with
more than one NGO.19 We now study such situations, but only consider the case in which
the government is the sole investor. This is equivalent to assuming that all parties invest
but the government’s investment is significantly more important than the investment of
any NGO.
There are N (N ≥ 1) NGOs, which are denoted by the integers 1, 2, . . . , N, and a
government, which, for notational convenience, is denoted by N + 1. Let θi > 0 (i =
1, 2, . . . , N, N + 1) be player i’s valuation of the project’s benefits, and πi its share of
authority, where πi ∈ [0, 1] and ∑N+1i=1 πi = 1. The vector of shares is given by π =
(π1, π2, . . . , πN , πN+1).
If all players reach an agreement to make decisions cooperatively at date 2, then player
i’s payoff is ui(y) = θib(y) + ti, where y denotes the government’s date 1 investment,
the transfer ti can be positive or negative, and sum of the transfers equals zero. If, how-
ever, the players fail to reach such an agreement, the project operates under the control
rights allocated at date 0, and player i’s default payoff is ui(y, π) = θi[απiBi(y) + (1 −
α)B(y, π)], where B(y, π) = ∑N+1k=1 πkBk(y) and Bk(y) is the project’s benefits when player
k has sole authority.
As before, we assume that for any y, b′(y) > B′N+1(y) > B
′
j(y) for all j = 1, 2, . . . , N:
that is, the marginal returns to the government’s investment are highest when the players
make decisions cooperatively, and second highest when the government has sole author-
ity. For simplicity and without loss of generality, we rewrite Assumption 2(iii) as follows:
Assumption 3. For any y, b′(y) > B′N+1(y) > B
′
N(y) > . . . > B
′
2(y) > B
′
1(y).
This ranks the marginal returns to government’s investment over the set of all possible
sole authority regimes (there are N + 1 such regimes). It implies that the marginal returns
are lowest when NGO 1 receives sole authority.
By definition, the Nash bargained payoff to player i at date 2 is20
Vi(y, π) = ui(y, π) +
1
N + 1
[
(N + 1)θb(y)−
N+1∑
k=1
uk(y, π)
]
, where (N + 1)θ =
N+1∑
k=1
θk.
19One of the few applications with multiple parties is in Hart and Moore (1990).
20In applying the (N + 1)–player Nash bargaining solution, we assume that the players have a choice be-
tween full cooperation and no cooperation. Thus, we rule out the possibility of partial cooperation, whereby
a subset (coalition) of players may cooperate while the remaining players make decisions on matters over
which they have received allocated control rights. Allowing for partial cooperation is interesting, but it
would take us beyond the scope of this paper. Hart and Moore (1990) provide the only study in this liter-
ature that considers more than two players with partial cooperation (albeit in the context of pure private
goods). They use the Shapley value to determine the outcome of the date 2 bargaining. This means that, by
definition, full cooperation is reached in equilibrium, although a player’s payoff is in general influenced by
the outcomes associated with partial cooperation.
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After substituting for the default payoffs, simplifying and collecting terms, we obtain
Vi(y, π) = θb(y) + (1−α)(θi −θ)B(y, π) +α
[
θiπiBi(y)− 1N + 1
N+1∑
k=1
θkπkBk(y)
]
.
Proposition 7. Suppose there is a finite but arbitrary number of NGOs and a government, who
is the sole investor.
(a) If the degree of impurity is sufficiently large, then it is optimal to allocate sole authority to the
government.
(b) If the degree of impurity is sufficiently small, then the optimal authority allocation depends
on whether the government’s valuation is greater or smaller than the average valuation of the
NGOs. When the government’s valuation is greater, it is optimal to allocate sole authority to the
government. When the government’s valuation is lower, it is optimal to allocate sole authority to
NGO 1 (under which the marginal returns to government investment are lowest; cf. Assumption
3).
Proof. In the appendix. 
When public-private projects deliver public goods with a high degree of excludability,
part (a) of Proposition 7 confirms the basic insight of Propositions 1 and 2: a GHM-type
effect dominates, and optimal authority allocations are primarily driven by technology
(rather than preferences). If instead the degree of impurity is small and we are close to
the BG world, part (b) shows that our previous results are not entirely robust. If, as before
and as in BG, the government cares most about the project, then full authority goes to
the government. But if the government cares less than the average NGO, then authority
should not go to the NGO with the highest valuation but to the NGO under which the
marginal returns to the government’s investment are the lowest.
We look at this last result by considering the limiting case of a pure public good (α = 0).
As in Section 3, the optimal allocation with only one investor is determined by assess-
ing how its investment incentives (or the marginal returns to its investment) vary as the
amount of authority allocated to each player varies. If α = 0 and the government (player
N + 1) is the sole investor, these incentives are given by
∂
∂πi
[
∂VN+1
∂y
]
= [θN+1 −θ]B′i(y),
where i = 1, 2, . . . , N, N + 1. If θN+1 < θ, the government’s incentives are strictly de-
creasing in each player’s share of authority. Because of this, full control rights should be
given to the party for which B′i(y) is minimal. Assumption 3 guarantees that this party
is NGO 1. Of course if there were only one NGO (as in previous sections and in BG),
this allocation would have been equivalent to the allocation based on the most caring
party principle. This discussion however shows that such a principle is not robust to the
presence of multiple NGOs.
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5.2. Joint Authority. We now go back to the basic model with two players and consider
what happens when they can opt for joint authority (BG; Halonen, 2002). Under joint
authority, each party has veto rights over all decisions. Thus, if at date 0 the parties agree
to operate the project under joint authority, they will need to cooperate at date 2. But if
the parties fail to agree, the project cannot go ahead, and their disagreement payoffs are
zero. Given that at date 2 they bargain over a surplus of size b(y), the Nash-bargained
payoff to each player (gross of its investment cost) is Z(y) = 12(θg + θn)b(y). A direct
implication is
Proposition 8. Suppose that the players can operate the project under joint authority. All the re-
sults of Sections 3 and 4 hold except when the investment of the low-valuation party is sufficiently
more important than that of the high-valuation party and the degree of impurity is small. Under
these circumstances, joint authority is optimal rather than sole authority to the high-valuation
party.
Proof. In the appendix. 
This proposition alters the results from Lemma 1(a) and from Propositions 2, 3, and 6(a).
The intuition behind this new result is simple. The low-valuation party whose investment
is more important has greater investment incentives under joint authority than when the
high-valuation party has full control rights (which is the best allocation among the set
of all shared allocations if the degree of impurity is sufficiently small). This is because
under joint authority the high-valuation party has no bargaining advantage as it would
have had under sole authority. Proposition 8 therefore extends what BG found for α = 0
(their Proposition 2) to cases in which there are sufficiently small degrees of impurity.
5.3. Ex-Post Uncertainty. So far, we considered equilibrium allocations in which the two
parties cooperate at date 2. Suppose instead that there is a positive probability that the
project operates under the initially specified control rights (Rasul, 2006). This could arise
for several reasons. For example, although at date 2 all parties know that it is mutually
beneficial to make decisions cooperatively, they still may fail to strike an agreement.21 In
addition, there might be some adverse circumstances under which the gains from coop-
eration at date 2 do not exist.
We consider two cases in which there is a small probability that at date 2 the parties
operate the project under the control rights allocated at date 0. These two cases differ in
the way uncertainty occurs. In what follows, we provide intuitive arguments to show
that our results are robust to both types of ex-post uncertainty.
First, suppose there exists a fixed probability, ω, with which the parties fail to strike a
deal at date 2. Hence, with probability ω the project is operated under the date 0 allocated
control rights. At the beginning of date 2, the equilibrium gross expected payoff to i (i =
21As in the bargaining theory literature, this failure may arise from either specific procedural features
(Muthoo, 1999) or the presence of bargaining costs (Anderlini and Felli, 2001).
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g, n) is (1−ω)Vi(y, π) +ωui(y, π). Clearly, when ω = 0 we are back to the basic model
of the two previous sections. Given Assumptions 1 and 2, the equilibrium investments
and the optimal shared authority allocation are continuous in ω. Thus, all the results of
the basic model will apply for sufficiently small values of ω.
Second, suppose there is a random variable, ξ , that positively affects the project ben-
efits when the parties cooperate. Let b(y,ξ) denote these benefits, with b being strictly
increasing and strictly concave in ξ . Let F be the distribution function of ξ , which has
finite support over the interval [0,ξ ]. Given these assumptions, for any π and y, there
exists a cut-off value of ξ , ξ∗(π , y), such that mutually beneficial gains from cooperation
exist if and only if the realized value of ξ is greater than or equal to this cut-off value.
Hence, with probability F(ξ∗(π , y)) the project is operated under the control rights π . At
the beginning of date 2 and before the realization of ξ , the equilibrium gross expected
payoff to i (i = g, n) is
ui(y, π)F(ξ∗(π , y)) +
∫ ξ
ξ∗(π ,y)
Vi(y, π ,ξ)dF(ξ).
Ifξ = 0, we return to the basic model. Since equilibrium investments and optimal author-
ity allocations are continuous in ξ , any small perturbation of ξ close to zero will deliver
our basic model’s results.
6. APPLICATIONS
6.1. The Provision of School Services: Government or NGOs? BG provide a compelling
argument to address the question of how the responsibilities of the state and the volun-
tary sector should be optimally allocated in financing (and generally providing inputs to)
public projects, such as schools, hospitals, and sanitation services. Their analysis shows
that ownership should reside with the party that cares most about the project. For the
cases in which the project delivers a pure public good, Sections 3 and 4 confirm this re-
sult. However, as pointed out in the Introduction, most public services that are provided
through public-private partnerships are characterized by some degree of impurity. In
general, this comes in the form of excludability, so that specific groups of consumers can
be prevented to enjoy the projects’ benefits either by means of price or through the impo-
sition of institutional or nonmarket restrictions.
Moreover, the line separating the state as education policymaker (i.e., setting objec-
tives, curricula, pedagogical methods, and the rules of the game) and as major provider
(i.e., providing teacher training, school construction and new information technologies,
and more generally running the school system) is often blurred (World Bank, 2004; Woess-
mann, 2006). In these cases, the standard allocation of authority, according to which the
state has full control rights over the school system, is difficult to reconcile with BG’s re-
sults unless the state is always the more caring party. There are however several recent
examples — especially in developing countries — that emphasize the importance of the
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voluntary sector in providing specific school services (e.g., textbooks, personnel train-
ing, and infrastructure maintenance) with the state retaining overall responsibility of the
school system (Narayan et al., 2000; World Development Report, 2004). This practice,
which also BG acknowledge (see BG, pp. 1363-65), is more in line with the idea of shared
authority as presented in Section 4.
There are many situations in which some specific responsibilities are shared between
the state or local educational authorities on one hand and the voluntary sector (in the
form of either NGOs or community-based organizations) on the other. For instance,
many decentralization programs have shifted the responsibility from the government
to local schools and parent-run school committees to purchase textbooks and provide
teacher incentives (Kremer, 2003, for Kenya), introduce catch-up classes for underper-
forming pupils in primary schools (Banerjee et al., 2003, for India), and improve school
quality through changes in teaching and learning practices (World Bank, 2004, for Cam-
bodia). In all such cases, however, the government keeps the overall governance of the
school system by overseeing the design of all basic educational policies. This allocation
of control rights could be justified without bringing into play arguments based on the
government’s greater valuation. In fact, sole authority to the government can occur: (a) if
the government is the only investor and the degree of excludability from the benefits of
school services is high (Proposition 1), or (b) if the government’s investment is substan-
tially more important than the parent-run school committee’s (Proposition 5).
There are other situations of greater school autonomy. For example, in Chile the in-
troduction of a voucher-type subsidy system and the entry of private organizations in
the market have led subsidized private schools to grow considerably in the last 20 years
and provide free educational services to more than one-third of all students (Mizala and
Romaguera, 2000). Similarly, after introducing a reform that involved parents in key gov-
ernance issues (such as hiring and dismissing teachers), El Salvador experienced a sub-
stantial increase in school participation, with reformed schools comprising more than 40
percent of all students enrolled in rural primary schools and 60 percent of all children in
preschools (World Bank, 2004). In these circumstances, NGOs or parents share some of
the authority over schools with the government. The prediction of Proposition 6(b) —
whereby control rights must be split between parties whose investments in excludable
public goods have similar importance — seems to fit well such circumstances.
Similar arguments apply also to other situations in which there is joint provision of
impure public goods by the government and NGOs or other concerned parties. Exam-
ples range from the provision of social services, agricultural projects, and microlending
in developing countries (Eversole, 2003) to the provision of water sanitation services, hos-
pitals and transportation infrastructure within public-private partnerships in industrial-
ized economies (e.g., U.S. Department of Transportation, 2004). How control rights are
split between NGOs and the government in these circumstances will depend on parties’
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preferences (relative valuations) and technologies (investments’ importance and dispens-
ability) as well as on the good’s degree of impurity. But in all cases, greater investment
incentives (and, hence, greater efficiency gains) can be guaranteed by authority alloca-
tions that equalize both parties’ bargaining powers.
6.2. Child Custody. The norms regulating child custody after divorce generally reflect
balances of power between husbands and wives as well as concerns for the rights and
needs of both children and parents (Mnookin and Kornhauser, 1979). For example, up to
the Guardianship of Infants Act of 1925, the British legislation was dominated by an ab-
solute paternal preference rule, whereby the father had unconditional rights in all family
matters. A court could not give custody to the mother, even if an abusive father might
lose his legal rights to child custody (Maidment, 1984). Such a rule would be hard to jus-
tify with the argument that the father values the benefits generated by children relatively
more than the mother, that is, on the basis of BG’s argument. It could however be inter-
preted along the lines of Propositions 1 and 2, in which the father may care less for the
child than the mother does but he is the sole investor and the degree of excludability is
very high (by law).
Instead, BG’s main result would suit the widely observed practice of custody rights
allocated to the mother, which was the explicit dominant norm in the United States over
the course of the twentieth century until the early 1970s (Mnookin, 1975), as long as the
mother values child’s well-being the most and parents’ investments are complements.
But an explicit maternal presumption is difficult to legitimize when the limited empirical
evidence on parental preferences is mixed, with some studies finding divorced mothers
to be less altruistic then divorced fathers and other studies finding the opposite (Flinn,
2000; Del Boca and Ribero, 2001). It is perhaps even harder to uphold in the many coun-
tries that, since the beginning of the 1970s, moved away from strict rules (e.g., paternal
preference or maternal preference) towards a more discretionary principle based on the
best interest of the child (Elster, 1989).
The introduction of this principle has been accompanied by a marked increase in shared
custody.22 This can be interpreted through the insights of Proposition 6(b): whenever
one parent can positively prevent the other parent to access their children, some form of
shared authority is the preferred allocation since it guarantees maximal investment incen-
tives from both parents. Of course, the exact distribution of custody rights is determined
by parental preferences and technologies on the basis of the notion of equalizing bargain-
ing powers. If, for example, both parents equally care for their children and provide in-
vestments that are equally important, custody rights should be equally split (Proposition
4).
22For instance, in Britain and the United States at the beginning of the twenty-first century, shared custody
arrangements account for nearly 30 percent of post-divorce living arrangements for children. Less than 10
percent of cases are awarded to the father, and the remaining three-fifths are awarded to the mother. Thirty
years earlier, shared custody was nonexistent with at least 90 percent of cases awarded to the mother.
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6.3. Other Applications. There are many other situations in which impure public goods
are produced by different parties and, thus, the allocation of control rights over such
goods and services may be an issue. Here, we briefly discuss a few examples.
Our analysis can be applied to government-sponsored research in universities that
leads to patented inventions. Suppose a patent is produced as a result of the investments
of both the state and a university. Suppose these investments are not fully contractible,
are of comparable importance, and are both equally dispensable. This may occur when
the state directly provides the funding and the university provides already existing phys-
ical assets and human capital. Our framework suggests that both parties should receive
roughly similar control rights over the services (and income) generated by the patent
(Proposition 4). This allocation is optimal even when the patented goods and services are
highly excludable (Proposition 6(b)). But if their degree of impurity is small, full control
rights should go to the university provided that the university is the more caring party
(Proposition 6(a)).
Another application of the model is to public service broadcasting (PSB). PSB programs
and channels are typically free to air, and are funded either by a license fee levied on all
television viewers, or through the sale of advertising airtime, or both. If PSB has a low
degree of excludability and the state has the highest valuation of such a service, then sole
authority should be given to the state regardless of technology considerations. Indeed,
this is what we observe in many countries (Djankov et al., 2003), and it is consistent with
BG and our Lemma 1(a) and Proposition 3(b). If the state, however, is not the party with
the highest valuation,23 control rights should go to private investors. Significant noncon-
tractible investments by both the state and the private sector will provide arguments in
support of other alternative allocations, including shared authority. Of course, if PSB pro-
grams are almost entirely excludable, so that television viewing becomes closer to other
activities in the “market for ideas” such as books and newspapers (Coase, 1974), author-
ity will have to be entirely allocated on the basis of the relative importance of the parties’
investments: in line with GHM, if a commercial broadcaster is the most efficient investor,
then this should also possess residual control rights.
Our framework can also be applied to scientific collaborations, where partners invest
in the project and directly care about its success. An example of such collaborations is
given by coauthorship, in which all authors share costs and benefits of their joint noncon-
tractible investments. Typically, coauthorships are equally shared (whether the authors
appear in alphabetical order or otherwise). According to our model (Proposition 4), this
arises because all authors have roughly equal valuations, and their contributions — as
perceived by (unbiased) readers — are equally important and equally indispensable. In-
terestingly, coauthorships among academic economists have increased markedly in the
last 30 years (Goyal et al., 2006).
23Besley and Prat (2004) and Prat and Stro¨mberg (2005), among others, discuss a number of reasons why
this may be the case.
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Our analysis goes through also if we consider situations in which impure public goods
and services are jointly produced by different government units (e.g., local versus state),
or by the state, for-profit and not-for-profit firms. An example of the latter situations is
given by the provision and management of medical care services. When the degree of
impurity of such services is large,24 and private investors are more efficient, then sole
authority to the private sector may be desirable (Proposition 5). This can provide an ad-
ditional argument for decentralization. But if the importance of the public and private
sectors’ medical care service investments is comparable, some form of shared division of
control rights will be optimal (Proposition 6(b)). Indeed, this fits well the recent experi-
ence of many European countries’ hospital market, with greater decision-making rights
over public facilities given to the private sector and increased encouragement of public-
private partnerships.
7. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has developed a framework for analyzing the distribution of decision-making
power in public-private partnerships. Because such partnerships typically deliver public
goods and services that have some element of excludability or rivarly, we have a theory
of allocation of authority over impure public goods, which comprise purely private goods
and purely public goods as special cases. We highlight five results, which allow us to
stress that the optimal allocation is inextricably linked to the degree of impurity of these
goods and the parties’ technologies and preferences. First, when the degree of impurity is
very low, authority should be given to the high-valuation party. Second, when the degree
of impurity is large, control rights should be entirely given to the main investor, irrespec-
tive of preference considerations. Third, there are some situations in which this allocation
is optimal even if the degree of impurity is low as long as one party’s investment is more
important than the other party’s. Fourth, if the parties’ investments are of similar impor-
tance and the degree of impurity is large, shared authority is optimal, and a relatively
greater share should go to the low-valuation party. Fifth, if the importance of the parties’
investments is similar and the degree of impurity is neither large nor small, sole authority
should go to the low-valuation party.
The last three results are new and, at varying degrees, in contrast to the main findings
reported in GHM or BG. Public-private projects are inevitably complex and, as such, may
require more sophisticated divisions of authority than those based solely on either invest-
ment or preference considerations. Furthermore, our notion of authority is broader than
that of asset ownership, which has been generally used in other incomplete contracting
models of the firm. It encompasses other sources of power, such as restricted access to
critical assets (Rajan and Zingales, 1998), effective control over decisions (Aghion and
24This can arise if privately owned hospitals are more responsive than centrally funded hospitals to gov-
ernment financial incentives by cream-skimming the type of patients they serve. For evidence in favor of
this possibility, see Duggan (2000).
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Tirole, 1997), and transfer of control rights (Aghion et al., 2004) within and between the
organizations involved in the provision of impure public goods and services. In a world
in which the private sector increasingly interacts with the state to deliver such goods and
services, our model and its results are likely to be relevant for understanding how these
two parties can be involved in their provision.
Finally, our analysis can be applied to a variety of other situations in which (private)
partners jointly produce impure public goods. Two of the examples we have mentioned
are parents’ investments in children that affect the design of child custody rules and sci-
entific collaborations. Again, our framework is useful to the extent that it provides a basis
for thinking about (authority allocation in) these processes, which have grown in the real
world far more quickly than our ability to understand them.
APPENDIX
LEMMA A.1 AND ITS PROOF
To establish Lemma A.1, in addition to Assumptions 1 and 2, we need to impose two other
technical restrictions: (R1) For each i = g, n, k = 1, 2, and for any y, |bkk(y)| ≥ |Bikk(y)|; and (R2)
For each i = g, n, k, l = 1, 2 with k = l, and for any y, |bkk(y)| − |bkl(y)| ≥ |Bikk(y)| − |Bikl(y)| ≥
0, where |x| denotes the absolute value of x.25 These restrictions ensure that the players’ Nash
bargained payoffs satisfy standard regularity conditions.
LEMMA A.1 (Equilibrium Investments). For any allocation of authority π , there exists a unique Nash
equilibrium of the date 1 investment game. This Nash equilibrium, ye(π) ≡ (yeg(π), yen(π)), is the unique
solution to the following first-order conditions:
Vg1 (y, π) = C
′
g(yg)
Vn2 (y, π) = C
′
n(yn).
In the unique Nash equilibrium, each player under-invests relative to his unique first-best investment level.
Furthermore,
∂yeg
∂π =
1
Σ
[
Vn23V
g
12 −Vg13
(
Vn22 − C′′n
)]
and
∂yen
∂π =
1
Σ
[
Vg13V
n
12 −Vn23
(
Vg11 − C′′g
)]
,
where Σ ≡ (Vg11−C′′g )(Vn22−C′′n )−Vg12Vn12 > 0, with all these second-order partial derivatives evaluated
at the Nash equilibrium investment levels.
Proof of Lemma A.1. We first establish the following claim which states some properties of the
players’ Nash-bargained payoff functions:
Claim A.1. Fix an arbitrary π ∈ [0, 1]. For each i = g, n, player i’s Nash-bargained payoff function,
Vi(y, π), satisfies the following properties:
(i) Vi is strictly increasing and twice continuously differentiable in y, strictly concave in yi, limyg→0 V
g
1 (y, π) =
limyn→0 Vn2 (y, π) = ∞, limyg→∞ V
g
1 (y, π) = limyn→∞ V
n
2 (y, π) = 0, and V
i(0, 0, π) > 0.
25The non-negativity conditions in (R2) are the conditions for the Hessian of each benefit function (b, Bg
and Bn) to be a dominant diagonal matrix. Furthermore, the first inequality in (R2) holds if and only if the
Hessian of the net benefit function b− Bi is a dominant diagonal matrix.
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(ii) For any y, the first-order derivative of Vi(y, π) with respect to yi is strictly less than (θg +θn)bk(y)
with k = 1 if i = g and k = 2 if i = n.
(iii) For any y, Vi12(y, π) ≥ 0.
(iv) The Hessian of Vi is a dominant diagonal matrix (i.e., for any y, the absolute values of both Vi11 and
Vi22 are greater than or equal to V
i
12).
Proof of Claim A.1. Fix π ∈ [0, 1]. After rearranging terms and simplifying, Vg and Vn can respec-
tively be usefully rewritten as follows (for expositional convenience, we suppress the arguments
of the functions):
2Vg = θg
[
π(b + Bg) + (1− π)[b + (1−α)Bn]
]
+θn
[
(1− π)(b− Bn) + π [b− (1−α)Bg]
]
2Vn = θg
[
π(b− Bg) + (1− π)[b− (1−α)Bn]
]
+θn
[
(1− π)(b + Bn) + π [b + (1−α)Bg]
]
.
It is now straightforward to establish Claim A.1 by examining the appropriate derivatives of these
two functions. It is easy, first, to verify that the results stated in parts (i) and (ii) of Claim A.1
follow given Assumptions 2(i)–(iii) and technical restriction (R1). Claim A.1(iii) follows given
Assumption 2 (iv). Claim A.1(iv) follows given technical restriction (R2).
We can now proceed to prove Lemma A.1. Given the properties of Vi established in Claims
A.1(i) and given Assumption 1, i’s payoff function, Vi − Ci, is continuous in y and strictly con-
cave in yi. As each player’s strategy set is compact, existence of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium
follows from the Debreu-Glicksberg-Fan existence results. Furthermore, a pair y is a Nash equilib-
rium investment pair if and only if y is a solution to the first-order conditions stated in Lemma A.1.
Using these first-order conditions and Claim 1(iv), it is easy to verify that the two best-reply func-
tions are contraction mappings. This implies that there exists at most a unique Nash equilibrium.
The under-investment conclusion follows from Claim A.1(ii).
Differentiating the first-order conditions with respect to π , given that investments are set at the
Nash equilibrium levels ye(π), and then solving for the derivatives of yeg and yen with respect to
π , we obtain the expressions stated in Lemma A.1, where (given Claims A.1(i) and A.1(iv), and
Assumption 1) Σ > 0.
PROOFS OF PROPOSITIONS 4–6
To establish Propositions 4 to 6, we first provide a general characterization of the optimal value of
π . To simplify the algebra, we assume that Ci(yi) = yi, and, as in BG, that μ(yi) = 2
√
aiyi + A,
where A is a positive constant. Using these functional forms into (5) and (6), simplifying and
collecting terms, it is straightforward to verify that g’s and n’s Nash-bargained marginal returns
to investment are respectively Vg1 (y) = λgμ
′(yg) and Vn2 (y) = λnμ
′(yn), where
λg =
agθg
2
([
(θ̂ +βg)(α −α∗g)
]
π +
[
1 + (1−α)βg + θ̂(1−βg)
])
and
λn =
anθg
2
([
(1 + θ̂βn)(α∗n −α)
]
π +
[
α + 2θ̂
])
.
The term λi (i = g, n), which is always strictly positive, measures i’s bargaining power. We now
prove a characterization of the optimal authority allocation for the parameter values in the non-
shaded region of Figure 2, the value of π that maximizes the equilibrium net surplus S (defined in
(7)). We use this to establish Propositions 4–6.
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Claim A.2 Assume that the parameters are such that (θ̂,α) lie in the non-shaded region of Figure 2 (i.e.,
such that α > max{α∗g ,α∗n}). Define
Γg =
[
α −α∗g
α −α∗n
][
θ̂(2−α)(θ̂ +βg)
(1 + θ̂βn)[1 +βn + θ̂(1− [1−α]βn)]
]
and
Γn =
[
α −α∗g
α −α∗n
][
(θ̂ +βg)[1−βg + θ̂(1 +βg) +αβg]
(2−α)(1 + θ̂βn)
]
.
(a) If an ≥ agΓn, then it is optimal to allocate sole authority to n (i.e, π∗=0).
(b) If agΓg < an < agΓn, then it is optimal to allocate some authority to g and some authority to n, where
π∗ ∈ (0, 1) and it is the unique solution to the following first-order condition:
(θg +θn)
[∂λg
∂π +
∂λn
∂π
]
=
λg
ag
[∂λg
∂π
]
+
λn
an
[
∂λn
∂π
]
.
(c) If an ≤ agΓg, then it is optimal to allocate sole authority to the government (i.e., π∗ = 1).
Furthermore, Γn > Γg; and for all θ̂ = 0 and θ̂ is finite, Γi > 0 (i = g, n). If θ̂ = 0 then Γg = 0 and Γn > 0;
and in the limit as θ̂ → ∞, Γn → ∞ and Γg converges to a strictly positive and finite number.
Proof of Claim A.2. Using the adopted benefit and cost functions, it follows from an application of
Lemma A.1 that the unique Nash equilibrium investment levels, for any π , are
yeg(π) =
(λg)2
ag
and yen(π) =
(λn)2
an
,
where λg and λn are defined above. It is straightforward to verify that for any y,
Vg2 (y) = [an(θg +θn)− λn]μ′(yn) and Vn1 (y) = [ag(θg +θn)− λg]μ′(yg).
After making the appropriate substitutions, simplifying and collecting terms, S′(π) defined in (8)
becomes
S′(π)
2
= (θg +θn)
[∂λg
∂π +
∂λn
∂π
]
− λg
ag
[∂λg
∂π
]
− λn
an
[
∂λn
∂π
]
.
It follows that S′′(π) < 0 for all π , and hence S is strictly concave in π . This implies that: (i) if
S′(0) ≤ 0 then π∗ = 0; (ii) if S′(1) ≥ 0 then π∗ = 1; and (iii) if S′(0) > 0 > S′(1) then π∗ ∈ (0, 1)
and it is the unique solution to S′(π) = 0.
Substituting for π = 0 and π = 1 respectively, we obtain
S′(0) =
[
(θg)2(1 + θ̂βn)(2−α)(α −α∗n)
2
][
agΓn − an
]
.
S′(1) =
[
(θg)2(1 + θ̂βn)[1 +βn + θ̂(1− [1−α]βn)](α −α∗n)
2
][
agΓg − an
]
.
Claim A.2 now follows from applying the results established here about the equilibrium net
surplus function, S. Note that Γn > Γg since (due to S being strictly concave) S′(0) ≤ 0 implies
S′(1) < 0.
Proof of Proposition 4. After the appropriate substitutions (given the hypothesis that θg = θn,
ag = an and βg = βn), we obtain that α∗g = α∗n = 0 and 0 < Γg < 1 < Γn. The proof follows
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because, when α > 0, Claim A.2(b) applies, and the first-order condition collapses to λg = λn.
Proposition 3 gives the result when α = 0.
Proof of Proposition 5. This proposition follows immediately from a straightforward application
of Claim A.2.
Proposition 6 (stated formally). Assume that an = ag, θ̂ = 1 and 1− βg = 1− βn = O(), where
O() is a term of order  with  being infinitesimal.
(a) If θ̂ < 1, then
π∗ =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
1 if 0 ≤ α ≤ O(),
0 if O() < α ≤ 1− θ̂ + O(),
α + θ̂− 1
α(1 + θ̂)
if 1− θ̂ + O() < α ≤ 1.
(a) If θ̂ > 1, then
π∗ =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
0 if 0 ≤ α ≤ O(),
1 if O() < α ≤ θ̂− 1
θ̂
+ O(),
α + θ̂− 1
α(1 + θ̂)
if
θ̂− 1
θ̂
+ O() < α ≤ 1.
Proof of Proposition 6. The hypothesis of this proposition imply that
Γg =
[
(2−α)θ̂
2 +αθ̂
]
+ O() and Γn =
[
2θ̂ +α
2−α
]
+ O().
Hence, the results of Proposition 3 and an application of Claim A.2 lead to the desired conclu-
sions about the boundaries of the various regions. As for the interior solution, this is obtained by
substituting for the various terms in the first-order condition stated in Claim A.2, simplifying and
collecting terms: the interior solution is the value of π at which λg = λn.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 7
Let ye(π) denote the government’s date 1 investment level, which is the unique solution to the
first-order condition VN+11 (y, π) = 1. For simplicity, we assume a constant marginal cost of in-
vestment, set equal to unity. At date 0, the net surplus for an arbitrary vector of shares, π =
(π1, π2, . . . , πN , πN+1), is
S(π) =
N+1∑
k=1
Vk(ye(π), π)− ye(π).
Our objective is to find the authority allocation which maximizes S(π).
For expositional convenience, we use the following notation. The first-order derivative of ye(π)
with respect to πi is denoted by yei (π) (where i = 1, 2, . . . , N, N + 1). For each k = 1, 2, . . . , N, N +
1, the first-order derivatives of Vk(y, π)with respect to y and πi respectively (where i = 1, 2, . . . , N, N+
1) are denoted by Vk1 and V
k
i+1. The second order, mixed derivative of V
k(y, π) with respect to y
and πi is denoted by Vk1,i+1. Finally, the second-order derivative of V
k(y, π) with respect to y is
Vk11.
In the expression for S(π), we first substitute for πN+1 by setting πN+1 = 1 − ∑Nk=1 πk. Now
differentiate S with respect to π j, where j = 1, 2, . . . , N − 1, N. Using the first-order condition,
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simplifying and collecting terms, for each j = 1, 2, . . . , N, we obtain
∂S
∂π j =
[
yej(π)− yeN+1(π)
] N∑
k=1
Vk1 +
N+1∑
k=1
[Vkj+1 −VkN+2].
It is straightforward to verify that ∑N+1k=1 Vkj+1 = 0 (for each j = 1, 2, . . . , N, N + 1). Using the
first-order condition, we obtain
yej(π)− yeN+1(π) =
[
−1
VN+111
][
VN+11, j+1 −VN+11,N+2
]
.
Straightforward computations establish that
VN+11, j+1 −VN+11,N+2 = (1−α)[θN+1 −θ]
[
B′j − B′N+1
]− α
N + 1
[
θ jB′j + NθN+1B
′
N+1
]
.
Hence, we have shown that for each j = 1, 2, . . . , N:
∂S
∂π j =
[
−∑Nk=1 Vk1
VN+111
][
(1−α)[θN+1 −θ]
[
B′j − B′N+1
]− α
N + 1
[
θ jB′j + NθN+1B
′
N+1
]]
.
The term in the first big brackets is strictly positive and independent of j. So we focus attention
on the term in the second big brackets. If α is sufficiently large, it follows that the right hand side
of this expression is strictly negative. Hence, π∗j = 0. Consequently π
∗
N+1 = 1 (i.e., it is optimal to
allocate sole authority to the government). This then establishes part (a) of the proposition.
Now suppose thatα is sufficiently small. IfθN+1 > θ, then (given Assumption 3) the right hand
side is again strictly negative, and hence π∗N+1 = 1. If, on the other hand, θN+1 < θ, then the
right hand side of the expression is strictly positive. Hence, for any j = 1, 2, . . . , N, the derivative
of S with respect to π j is strictly positive. Letting, for convenience, Sj and Sk respectively denote
the first-order derivatives of S with respect to π j and πk, note that Sj > Sk if and only if B′N+1 −
B′j > B
′
N+1 − B′k. Hence, Assumption 3 implies that π∗1 = 1. This then establishes part (b) of the
proposition.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 8
Consider first the case in which g is the sole investor. If g’s investment incentives are higher
under the optimal shared authority allocation (π∗ ∈ [0, 1]) than under joint authority — i.e., for
any yg, V
g
1 (y, π
∗) ≥ Z1(y) — then the date 0 equilibrium net surplus under the optimal shared
authority allocation is higher than under joint authority. (Similar arguments hold for the opposite
case in which g’s investment incentives are lower.) Using this observation, we now establish the
following set of results:
(i) If α = 0, then it is optimal to allocate sole authority to the sole investor provided it is the more
caring party. Otherwise (when θg < θn), it is optimal to operate the project under joint authority.
(ii) Lemmas 1(b) and 1(c), and Proposition 1.
(iii) If α > α̂g, where α̂g = (θ̂ − 1)/θ̂ (which is strictly greater than α∗g when θ̂ > 1), then it
is optimal to allocate sole authority to g. Otherwise (when α < α̂g) it is optimal to operate the
project under joint authority.
It is straightforward to verify that for any yg,
Vg1 (y, π
∗)  Z1(y) ⇐⇒ Υg ≡
[
θg − (1−α)θn
]
π∗Bg1(y) +
[
(1−α)θg −θn
]
(1− π∗)Bn1 (y)  0.
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After substituting for α = 0, it follows that Υg  0 ⇔ θg  θn. Result (i) follows immediately,
and the first part of Lemma 1(c) carries over. After substituting for α = 1 and π∗ = 1, it follows
that Υg > 0, and hence Lemma 1(b) carries over. Substituting for θg = θn, α > 0 and π∗ = 1, it
follows that Υg > 0, and hence the second part of Lemma 1(c) carries over. Given the hypothesis
of Proposition 1, it follows after substituting for π∗ = 1 that Υg > 0, and hence Proposition 1
carries over. As for Proposition 2, assume that α > α∗g . After substituting for π∗ = 1, it follows
that Υg > 0 if and only if α > α̂g. Now assume that α < α∗g . After substituting for π∗ = 0, it
follows that Υg < 0. Result (iii) follows immediately.
We now turn to the case when both can invest. It is straightforward to verify that for any y,
Vn2 (y, π
∗)  Z2(y) ⇐⇒ Υn ≡
[
(1−α)θn −θg
]
π∗Bg2(y) +
[
θn − (1−α)θg
]
(1− π∗)Bn2 (y)  0.
Under the hypotheses of Proposition 4, it follows that both Υg and Υn are strictly positive. This
implies that the conclusion of Proposition 4 carries over. Now we show that Propositions 6(b) and
6(c) carry over. From the proof of Proposition 6 we know that at the optimal shared authority
allocation, λg = λn = λ∗. Hence under the optimal shared authority allocation, the parties’ mar-
ginal investment returns are identical. Furthermore, since (under the hypothesis of Proposition 6)
an = ag = a, it follows that under joint authority, the parties’ marginal investment returns are iden-
tical. Thus, the desired conclusion follows once we show these identical returns are lower than the
identical returns under the optimal shared authority allocation. To do so, we need to show that
λ∗ > a(θg +θn)/2. After substituting the optimal value of π (namely, π∗ = (α + θ̂− 1)/α(1 + θ̂)
since α > max{1− θ̂, (θ̂− 1)/θ̂}) into λn, simplifying and collecting terms, it follows that the de-
sired conclusion holds provided that [α − (1− θ̂)][α − (θ̂ − 1)/θ̂] > 0, which holds. Proposition
5, which applies when the degree of impurity is sufficiently large, carries over. This is because the
payoffs are additive, and given the first part of Result (iii) above. Proposition 6(a) is an application
of Proposition 3, and this result alters as we now explain, just like Proposition 2 did for the sole
investor case. Suppose g’s investment is sufficiently more important than n’s, who however is the
high valuation party. This means that greater weight in the additive net surplus function is at-
tached to g’s investment, and that the optimal shared authority allocation is n-sole authority. The
desired conclusion follows since g’s investment incentives are even greater under joint authority.
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